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It! THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HICHAEL 1-'. STRAND, 
Plaintiff-Appellant. Case No. 16176 
vs. 
JACK CRANNEY, et al. 
Defendants-Respondents. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
* * -I: "i': ...... ·'· ·'· .. '· ·'· ;~ ~-   ,. ..
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
* .• 
The Plaintiff-Appellant petitions the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah for rehearing on its Decision rendered 
in the above-entitled case on February 14, 1980. 
ARGUHENT 
Point I 
THE ~liSl1'lDERSTMmr;:GS BETHEE~ TilE PARTIES 1-'ER.E 
NOT tiERELY co::CER.::Il'G DETAILS BUT CO~~CER.i'lWG THE 
ESSEr:CE AND CWDITIO~J OF A JOINT VE~TURF. AGRFE~·iENT. 
AsstEning ~~cndo that the parties had agrEoed to a 
joint venture ~·ith respect to shares of stock in Classic 
!lining Corporation, there is no question that there was no 
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agreenent concerning who had the right to determine 
when, where and if to sell partnershio property. The 
Defendant's own testimony acknowledr.es this. (Tr. 53, 
56-57, 127-131) The proposed partnership agreement con-
tained Lh~ provision that the Plaintiff was to determine 
when, where and if to sell the Classic stock and the 
Defendant's te~tinony was that he refused to sign the 
agreement because of such provision (Tr. 51-54, Exhibit 8, 
Tr. 134, 231-236) Further, the Defendant refused to be 
bound by the Plaintiff's decision to sell the stock 
(Tr. 136-137) Strand testified that he would not enter 
into a joint venture unless he alone had the right to 
determine when to sell. (Tr. 166-167) 
The Utah Supreme Court's Opinion was that there 
was a j0int vcntun· agrecr.cnt but a ncre l'lisundcrstanding 
a~ to s0~1e dct.1ils. !101-.'cvcr, the .Juthority to dc·tcrl'linc 
1.·hen, "here, .J!Hl if to sell is not a l'll'H' detail, but a 
ct,nditi<•n t<' an :q;rcc::'.cnt c•r- a l'1PC'tin0 of the r.inds. The 
\. L': (' ~- : • ' 
~: l' 1 f- l • ': \' '," l l : ! , : \.' !' ~ 1, r • "- f 
) " ~ ; ~ : t ' . ' 
·' 
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company; in this case, Classic ~fining Corporation. If 
the Plaintiff, tir. Strand, was to do his job and use 
the money furnished by Mr. Cranney in pursuit of such 
endeavor, then he would create an interest or demand for 
Classic Mining Corporation's stock. He can do so in 
several ways. He could create demand from investors, 
either institutional or individual. He could inform 
brokers about the prospects for Classic ~ining Corpora-
tion in hopes that they \olill create interests among 
their customers. He could induce traders in the over-
the-counter Market to "make Market" in the stock of 
Classic, and usually in so doing, he promises to indemnify 
thP trRrlPr~ aEainst ~ny possible lo~~ in cannecticn with 
their trading of Classic. It is for this purpose that 
he would need funds such as those from Defendant, 
Cranney. Further, to create interest he may oromise to 
sell a portion of his holdin~s below the market if the 
purchasers v•ere to make further purchases at the market. 
These are sc,me of the reasons 1-.•hy it is necessary for 
the prouoter to have the right to deternine when, Hhere, 
and if Lo sell Lite stock Phich is the subject of a joint 
venture agreement . This very thing occurred in the 
pc-cccnt case and th<' Defendant testified that he did not 
cc,n::i c!L·:C lli:lc:cl f bo~encl b\' ':r. Strand's transactions. 
-3-
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The price of a particular stock is based u~on supply 
and demand. If the demand is created for a stock then 
the price should keep rising as long as supply of stock 
i1 not fed into the market at the quoted price. If Defendant 
Cranney were allowed to sell into the market demand 
created by Plaintiff Strand, the whole purpose for the 
joint venture would be defeated. The price would not 
rise and no profit would be made. Thus, the disagreement 
on the single issue of who had the right to determine when 
and where and if to sell Classic '1ining Corporation stock--
the subject of the joint venture--defeats the whole purpose 
for the joint venture and prevents a meeting of the minds 
on an agreement, not merely a detail of the venture. 
The Utah Supreme Court's Decision citing that 
Bassett v. Baker, Utah, 530 P.2d 1, 2 (1974) notes that 
the right to control is an essential term of a joint 
venture agree~ent. See also, Johanson Hros. Builders vs. 
B. D. of Revie...:, 118 t:t.ah 38.'., 222 P. 2d 563 (1950). 
Point 11 
1111: PF'T'lY 0 1Z!l!·:!z':!l ]': CCI':.:.··.'~\· ·:·r, ; :·1: -n:ll.'-:c: ('F 
A:\Y ACRF:!:'T::T ,\::;1 Ti:i: 1 ~:·; 1:·: rw:::: OF ·;·:": P,\':Jil:S. 
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Court's Decision, the remedy of dissolution of the 
and distribution of the stock is contrary to the agre....c 
of the parties and would frustrate the whole purpose for 
the venture. If the stock were distributed between the 
parties, then each party would presumably have the right 
to sell when and if he desired. This would mean that 
the parties would get differing amounts from the proceeds 
of their sales. However, the agreement testified to by 
Defendant Cranney, found by the Utah Court, and affirmed 
by this Court contemplates a division of the proceeds 
from the sale of stock, not a division of the stock itself. 
Therefore, the Order of the Court should be that if in 
fact the partnership or joint venture exists, that the 
parties should be required to sell the stock and in 
either the manner contemplated by the agreement, or to 
appoint a receiver and alloH him to sell the stock and 
then the proceeds should be divided. 
Such a resolution only makes sense. The price of the 
Classic tlining Corporation stock, since the parties ini-
tiated their trans<1ction has risen from twenty cents per 
share to a high of four dollars and fifty cents per share. 
At the Lime of uriting this Petition for Rehearing, the 
price is three dollars and twenty-five cents per share, 
or do~m <1pproximately one dollar and a quarter. The price 
-5-
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has dropped nearly a dollar since the announcement of this 
Decision in the Enterprise, a newspaper of general circula-
tion in the investment community in Salt Lake City. If 
the Decision of this Court remains that the stock is to 
be distributed between the parties, there is no question 
that the price will continue to drop. There will be no 
incentive to create an interest a~d demand for Classic 
Mining Corporation stocl~ if Mr. Cranney is allmved to 
sell into the deoand. Thus, the Court should re-examine 
the judy.ment of the trial court affirmed by the Supreme 
Court which ordered a dissolution of the venture and a 
distribution of the stock. 
!).~.::.n thi:; 
Respectfully submitted 
Richard J. Leedy 
Attorney for Appellant 
610 East Soutb Temnle 
Salt Lake City, VT 84102 
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I hereby certify that on this __ day of February, 
1980, I did mail a true and accurate copy of the foregoing 
Petition for Rehearing And Brief In Support Thereof to 
Bryce E. Roe, Attorney for Respondent, 340 East 400 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, postage prepaid, in the 
United States Hail. 
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